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Adam Smith is the author of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations. He is known mainly as a pioneer of political economy. 
However, he was not only an economist but also a moral philosopher. He 
published The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) in 1759. In TMS, he 
explained an establishment of a social order based on sympathy between 
people in a society. Sympathy is sharing of sentiments with others by 
imaginarily swapping situations with others. People in TMS form the 
impartial spectator and regulate their conduct to be sympathized by the 
impartial spectator. The impartial spectator is often considered as an 
important concept in TMS. However, even if people formed the impartial 
spectator, this does not mean that they can always regulate their conduct. To 
regulate their conduct absolutely, people need general rules of morality 
(GRM). People can establish a social order thanks to GRM. 
Some preceding studies have reinterpreted TMS with various research 
results in contemporary economics. For example, Meardon & Ortmann 
(1996) reinterprets self-command by using a repeated game theory model. 
Ashraf et al. (2005) indicates that Smith foresaw some research findings of 
behavioral economics. Tajima (2007) reinterprets TMS from a perspective of 
institutional economics. Bréban (2012) formularizes a behavior of people in 
TMS with a utility function, and compares this function with utility 
functions in behavioral economics. Khalil (2017) reinterprets TMS from a 
perspective of rational choice theory. These reinterpretations have shed light 
on modern significance of TMS.  
However, there is room for reinterpreting important concepts in TMS 
with research results in contemporary economics. Following the preceding 
studies, this paper reinterprets the GRM formation process and the 
                                                   




corruption of moral sentiments (CMS) by using a replicator dynamics model, 
which is a basic model of evolutionary game theory. GRM are the social 
norms in TMS that concern what is fit and proper either to be done or to be 
avoided. In TMS, people form GRM through interactions with others. They 
continually observe conduct of others, and this can lead them to form certain 
GRM. This paper interprets this observation process as a trial-and-error 
learning process. To formularize this process, this paper uses a replicator 
dynamics model. 
The results of the model clarify the character of sympathy in the CRM. 
The more sympathetic players exist in a player set, the more corrupted 
situation is likely to be realized. This result mathematically supports an 
interpretation in preceding studies (Brown 1994, Griswold 1999) that 
sympathy involves risk that CMS is progressing. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the section 2, we briefly describe 
GRM and the CMS. In the section 3, we construct a model of replicator 
dynamics. In the section 4, we discuss the results of the model. In the last 




2. The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
 
2.1 General Rules of Morality 
People in TMS form the impartial spectator and regulate their conduct to 
be sympathized by the impartial spectator. The impartial spectator is often 
considered as an important concept in TMS. However, even if people formed 
the impartial spectator, this does not mean that they can always regulate 
their conduct. This is because “so partial are the views of mankind with 
regard to the propriety of their own conduct, both at the time of action and 
after it; and so difficult is it for them to view it in the light in which any 
indifferent spectator would consider it” (TMS. III.iv.4). Smith called this kind 
of problematic situation “self-deceit” (TMS.III.iv.4). According to Smith, to 
cope with self-deceit, Nature gave people GRM. GRM are the social norms in 
TMS concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided. 
“General rules of conduct, when they have been fixed in our mind by habitual 
reflection, are of great use in correcting the misrepresentations of self-love 
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concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our particular situation” 
(TMS. III.iv.12). GRM are necessary to maintain social orders. “The regard to 
those general rules of conduct, is … the only principle by which the bulk of 
mankind are capable of directing their actions” (TMS. III. v.1). Smith 
referred to cases that people do not have to follow GRM strictly. However, he 
held that people should strictly follow GRM of virtue of justice, which is 
essential for the establishment of the social order in TMS. Virtue of justice 
requires not doing “real and positive hurt to some particular persons, from 
motives, which are naturally disapproved of” (TMS.II.ii.1.5). “If it [justice] is 
removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society… must in a 
moment crumble into atoms” (TMS.II.ii.3.4). 
GRM about actions to be avoided are formed thorough the following 
process. People’s sentiments are shocked from some immoral action of others, 
with which the impartial spectator has no sympathy. People feel this kind of 
action unseemly. When people hear others express the same feeling as them, 
“this still further confirms, and even exasperates our [their] natural sense of 
their deformity” (TMS.III.4.7). After repeatedly hearing others express the 
same feeling as them, people “resolve never to be guilty of the like, nor ever, 
upon any account, to render ourselves in this manner the objects of universal 
disapprobation” (TMS.III.4.7). Then, people form a GRM about an action to 
be avoided. GRM about actions to be done are formed through a similar 
process as the GRM about actions to be avoided. 
 
 
2.2 The Corruption of Moral Sentiments 
Smith added a chapter about corruption of moral sentiments (CMS) in 
the sixth edition of TMS. According to Smith, disposition to “admire, and 
almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to 
neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to 
establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, 
at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our 
moral sentiments” (TMS.I.iii.3.1). He distinguished two moral principles: the 
road to virtue and the road to fortune. People in the road to virtue try to be 
respected “by the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue”, whereas people 
in the road to fortune do so “by the acquisition of wealth and greatness”. The 




In explaining why the CMS occurs, Smith distinguished two different 
ranks of life: middling–inferior stations of life and superior stations of life 
(Brown 1994, 35). This distinction characterizes the CMS (Hill 2006, 650). In 
superior stations, the road to fortune causes the CMS, because, in superior 
stations, “success and preferment depend, not upon the esteem of intelligent 
and well-informed equals, but upon the fanciful and foolish favour of 
ignorant, presumptuous, and proud superiors” (TMS.I.iii.3.6). In superior 
stations, the impartial spectator is too weak to prevent people from 
corrupting (Hill 2006, 650–651). 
In middling–inferior stations, the road to fortune basically causes no 
corruption, but people in these stations admire and imitate people in 
superior stations. This happens due to a character of sympathy with joy 
(Tajima 2007, 591). People in middling–inferior stations imitate people in 
superior stations, and this cause the CMS in middling–inferior stations 
(TMS.I.iii.3.7). Superior stations popularize not only a fashion but also vices 
and follies.  
Some authors consider that the CMS was the dominant Smith’s motive 
for publishing the sixth edition (Dickey 1986, 608;32 Evensky 1989, 131; 




3 Formularizing the formation process of GRM  
 
3.1 The model 
As we briefly explained above, GRM are “formed, by finding from 
experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain 
manner, are approved or disapproved of” (TMS.III.4.8). This formation 
process of GRM can be regarded as a process of trial-and-error. Trial-and- 
error learning is a kind of empirical learning, through which people evaluate 
their choice based on its consequence and modify their way of choice. In the 
formation process, people evaluate justifiability of their feeling based on 
whether others express the same feeling as them or not. When they know 
others express the same opinion as them, this justifies their opinion. People 
evaluate justifiability of their feeling (choice) based on whether others 
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express the same opinion (consequence). 
To formularize the learning process, this paper uses a replicator 
dynamics model with two strategies. Players have their mixed strategies on 
the two strategies. The set of players is 𝐼 = {1,2, … , 𝑛}, where 𝑛 = 2𝑚(𝑚 ∈ ℕ). 
The set of pure strategies of player 𝑖 is 𝑆𝑖 = {𝐴, 𝐵}. We consider strategy A as 
virtue strategy. We consider strategy B as fortune strategy. These two 
strategies derive from the road to virtue and the road to fortune in the CMS 
(TMS. I.iii.3.1). 
The mixed strategy of player 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 is 𝑥𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖𝐴, 𝑥𝑖𝐵) ∈ [0,1]
2. The profile of 
mixed strategies of players is 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . , 𝑥𝑛) ∈ [0,1]
2×𝑛. 
In the model, choosing a strategy means that the player considers he 
should choose this strategy. Justifiability of each strategy is reflected in 
mixed strategies. We assume probabilistic choice of players because, before 
GRM is formed, people in TMS probabilistically choose what they should do. 
Before GRM is formed, people sometimes fail to choose what the impartial 
spectator suggests because they suffer from “self-deceit” (TMS. III.iv.4). Once 
GRM is formed, they can surely choose what the impartial spectator 
suggests. 
Trial-and-error learning processes have been formularized by using some 
evolutionary game models.2 This paper uses a simple replicator dynamics 
model among evolutionary game models, because other models involve 
assumptions which cannot be supported by sentences in TMS.  
Each player is randomly matched with one player and then observes the 
choice of the opponent. This matching with observation is continuously 
repeated. 
Each 𝑖 ’s 𝑥𝑖𝐴  changes depending on their payoffs of each game. Pure 
strategies of player 𝑖  is 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 . The profile of pure strategies is  𝑠 =
(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛 ), and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 =×𝑖=1
𝑛 𝑆𝑖. For any 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, payoff of player 𝑖 is defined 
with pure strategy payoff function 𝜋𝑖: 𝑆 → ℝ. 
When mixed strategy profile 𝑥 ∈ [0,1]2×𝑛  is given, 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛 ) ∈ 𝑆 
has the probability 𝑥(𝑠) = ∏ 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∈ [0,1].  
Let 𝑢𝑖: [0,1]
2×n → ℝ be 
𝑢𝑖(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑥(𝑠)𝜋𝑖(𝑠)
𝑠∈𝑆
. 
Function 𝑢𝑖 is expected payoff of player 𝑖 when 𝑥 ∈ [0,1]
2×𝑛 is played. 
                                                   




𝑠𝑖  denote the mixed strategy of 𝑖 when 𝑖 chooses pure strategy 𝑠𝑖 . 
Expected payoff of player 𝑖 when 𝑖 chooses 𝑒𝑖
𝑠𝑖 is 𝑢𝑖(𝑥1, … , 𝑒𝑖
𝑠𝑖 , … 𝑥𝑛). 
To know the behavior of 𝑥, knowing the behavior of 𝑥A = (𝑥1𝐴, … , 𝑥𝑛𝐴) ∈
[0,1]𝑛 is sufficient. Let the dynamics of 𝑥𝑖𝐴 be 
?̇?𝑖𝐴 = [𝑢𝑖(𝑥1, … , 𝑒𝑖
𝐴, … 𝑥𝑛) − 𝑢𝑖(𝑥)]𝑥𝑖𝐴, 
where 𝑢𝑖(𝑥) is the expected payoff of 𝑖 when 𝑥 is played, and 𝑢𝑖(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑖𝐴 ∙
𝑢𝑖(𝑥1, … , 𝑒𝑖
𝐴, … 𝑥𝑛) + 𝑥𝑖𝐵 ∙ 𝑢𝑖(𝑥1, … , 𝑒𝑖
𝐵, … 𝑥𝑛) holds. In the dynamics，the higher 
expected payoff of a strategy is, the higher the probability of choosing the 
strategy becomes. 
The payoff matrix of 𝑖 is described as follows.  
 
 
Table  Payoff of player 𝑖  
 
 
Let us define 𝛼𝑖 ≡ 𝑎𝐴𝐴
𝑖 − 𝑎𝐵𝐴
𝑖  and 𝛽𝑖 ≡ 𝑎𝐴𝐵
𝑖 − 𝑎𝐵𝐵
𝑖 . The simultaneous 
differential equations of the dynamics are the following. To derive the 
equations, we used 𝑢𝑖(𝑥1, … , 𝑒𝑖
𝐴, … 𝑥𝑛) = 𝑎𝐴𝐴
𝑖 (∑ 𝑥𝑗𝐴𝑗≠𝑖 𝑛 − 1⁄ ) + 𝑎𝐴𝐵
𝑖 (1 −
(∑ 𝑥𝑗𝐴𝑗≠𝑖 𝑛 − 1⁄ ))，and 𝑢𝑖(𝑥1, … , 𝑒𝑖
𝐵, … 𝑥𝑛) = 𝑎𝐵𝐴
𝑖 (∑ 𝑥𝑗𝐴𝑗≠𝑖 𝑛 − 1⁄ ) + 𝑎𝐵𝐵
𝑖 (1 −
(∑ 𝑥𝑗𝐴𝑗≠𝑖 𝑛 − 1⁄ )). 
 
?̇?1𝐴 = ((𝛼1 − 𝛽1)(
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝐴𝑗≠1
𝑛 − 1
⁄ ) + 𝛽1) 𝑥1𝐴(1 − 𝑥1𝐴)， 
⋮ 
?̇?𝑖𝐴 = ((𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝐴𝑗≠𝑖
𝑛 − 1
⁄ ) + 𝛽𝑖) 𝑥𝑖𝐴(1 − 𝑥𝑖𝐴)， 
⋮ 









?̇?𝑛𝐴 = ((𝛼𝑛 − 𝛽𝑛)(
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝐴𝑗≠𝑛
𝑛 − 1
⁄ ) + 𝛽𝑛) 𝑥𝑛𝐴(1 − 𝑥𝑛𝐴)。 
From these equations, all edge points are equilibrium points. In this 
dynamics, all interior points are not asymptotically stable. We can proof this 
result by using the proposition 6.6 in Weibull(1997). To consider the 
asymptotically stable points, we only need to check edge points.  
This paper assumes that there are three types of players. These types are 
defined based on payoff matrices. 





Sympathy type players get higher payoff when they choose the same strategy 
as their opponents. 
Player 𝑖 is virtue type if 𝛼𝑖 > 0，𝛽𝑖 > 0. Virtue type players get higher 
payoff when they choose strategy A than when they choose strategy B. This 
means ?̇?𝑖𝐴 > 0 holds except at equilibrium points.  
Player 𝑖  is fortune type if 𝛼𝑖 < 0，𝛽𝑖 < 0 . Fortune type players get 
higher payoff when they choose strategy B than when they choose strategy A. 
This means ?̇?𝑖𝐴 < 0 holds except at equilibrium points. 
 
 
3.2 Seven Cases of Games 
There are seven cases of games because we assume three types of players. 
Results of the seven cases are shown in the following. This paper provides 
supplementary information in the appendix. 
 
Case 1  All players are sympathy type 
Both (0,0, … ,0)  and (1,1, … ,1)  are asymptotically stable. Asymptotical 
stability of the other edge points depends on each player ’s 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖. 
 
 
Case 2  All players are fortune type 
(0,0, … ,0)  is the unique asymptotically stable point because ?̇?𝑖𝐴 < 0 







Case 3  All players are virtue type 
(1,1, … ,1)  is the unique asymptotically stable point because ?̇?𝑖𝐴 > 0 
holds for any 𝑖 except at equilibrium points. 
 
 
Case 4  Sympathy type and fortune type 
(0,0, … ,0) is asymptotically stable, but (1,1, … ,1) is not asymptotically 
stable. Asymptotical stability of other edge points depends on each player ’s 
𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖. 
 
 
Case 5  Sympathy type and virtue type 
(1,1, … ,1) is asymptotically stable, but (0,0, … ,0) is not asymptotically 
stable. Asymptotical stability of other edge points depends on each player ’s 
𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖. 
 
 
Case 6  Virtue type and fortune type 
Without loss of generality, assume player 1 to player 𝑝 are fortune type. 
The asymptotically stable point is unique, and, at this point, the first 
element to the 𝑝th elements are all 0, and the rest elements are all 1. This 
is because, except at equilibrium points, ?̇?𝑖𝐴 < 0 holds for any fortune type 
player, and ?̇?𝑖𝐴 > 0 holds for any virtue type player. 
 
 
Case 7  Three types 













Smith considered the road to fortune causes the CMS. We can consider 
that the existence of fortune type characterizes the CMS. That is why this 
paper clarifies what the existence of fortune type means. This paper 
compares case 3 and 6 first. Then this paper compares case 1 and 4, and case 
5 and 7. 
We define a degree of corruption as the number of players choosing 
fortune strategy. By this definition, the most corrupted point is (0,0, … ,0). In 
contrast, the least corrupted point is (1,1, … ,1), where we can consider a 
GRM is formed. 
Let us assume a change from case 3 to 6. Adding fortune type players 
increases the degree of corruption at the asymptotically stable point by the 
number of the fortune type. When the number of the fortune type is less, the 
degree of corruption is also less. 
Next, let us assume a change from case 1 to 4. In case 1, both (0, … ,0) 
and (1, … ,1) are asymptotically stable regardless of each player’s 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖. 
In case 4, (1, … ,1) becomes not asymptotically stable, and (0, … ,0) becomes 
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the unique point that is asymptotically stable regardless of each player ’s 𝛼𝑖 
and 𝛽𝑖. Adding merely one fortune type player makes the most corrupted 
point, (0, … ,0), be the unique point. 
Last, let us assume a change from case 5 to 7. In case 5, (1,1, … ,1), the 
least corrupted point, is asymptotically stable regardless of each player ’s 𝛼𝑖 
and 𝛽𝑖. This never holds once adding merely one fortune type player. 
As shown above, adding fortune type players increases the degree of 
corruption of asymptotically stable points. In case 1 and 5, such an addition 
can increase the degree of corruption more than by the number of the fortune 
type. We can consider such increase of the degree of corruption is more 
severe in case 1 (to 4) than in case 5 (to 7). This is because, only in case 4, the 
most corrupted point (0, … ,0) is the unique asymptotically stable point. 
Thus, the more sympathy type players exist, the more corrupted situation 




1 to 4 (1,1, … ,1) becomes not asymptotically stable. 
(0, … ,0) becomes the unique asymptotically stable point. 
3 to 6 The degree of corruption of asymptotically stable points increases 
by the number of the fortune type players. 
5 to 7 (1,1, … ,1) becomes not asymptotically stable. 




5 Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides a formularization of corruption of moral sentiments 
(CMS), which is consistent with the formation process of general rules of 
morality (GRM). The model reveals that the more sympathy type players 
exist, the more corrupted situation fortune type players cause. 
The result is consistent with an interpretation in preceding studies 
(Brown 1994; Griswold 1999) that sympathy involves risk that CMS is 
progressing. Sympathy type players are consistent with sympathy as its 





Let us consider the Jacobian matrix of the simultaneous differential 
equations of the dynamics. A necessary and sufficient condition for 
equilibrium points to be asymptotically stable is that the Jacobian is stable. 
In the following, we consider only equilibrium edge points. This is because all 
interior points are not asymptotically stable in the dynamics. We can proof 
this result by using the proposition 6.6 in Weibull(1997). 
Diagonal component of the Jacobian at 𝑖th row is  
𝜕?̇?𝑖𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝐴
= ((𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)(
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝐴𝑗≠𝑖
𝑛 − 1
⁄ ) + 𝛽𝑖) (1 − 2𝑥𝑖𝐴). 






𝑥𝑖𝐴(1 − 𝑥𝑖𝐴). 
At equilibrium edge points, non-diagonal components of the Jacobian are 
zero. Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium edge points 
to be asymptotically stable is that all diagonal components of the Jacobian 
are negative. 
We can get the results of case 1 to 7 by using the above information. Let 
us consider case 1 for instance.  
 
Case 1 All players are sympathy type 
(0,0, … ,0)  and (1,1, … ,1)  are asymptotically stable. Asymptotical 
stability of the other edge points depends on each player ’s 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖. 
 
At (0,0, … ,0) and (1,1, … ,1), all diagonal components of the Jacobian are 
negative. Thus, (0,0, … ,0) and (1,1, … ,1) are asymptotically stable. At other 
edge points, the sign of diagonal components can be positive depending on 
each player’s 𝛼𝑖  and 𝛽𝑖 . For example, at (0,0, … ,0,1) , the diagonal 
component of the Jacobian at first row is (𝛼1 − 𝛽1)(
1
𝑛 − 1⁄ ) + 𝛽1, which can 
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